This paper explores the e¤ect of a potential joint-venture breakup on the level of technology transfer in a set-up with exploration-exploitation trade-o¤s in the presence of time compression costs. We consider a joint-venture relationship between a technologically advanced multinational …rm and a local …rm operating in a developing economy where the ability to enforce contracts is weak, and the local …rm can quit without penalties. The multinational …rm has to consider the advantages and disadvantages of an intensive transfer of technology versus an extensive one. In response to the breakup incentives, the multinational …rm reduces the intensity (lowering the pace) and opts for a more extensive transfer mode (longer duration of transfer), compared to the …rst best. The scheme is supported by a ‡ow of side payments to encourage the local …rm to stay longer. We show that a fall in time compression costs may increase or decrease the intensity of technology transfer, both in the …rst-best and in the second-best scenarios, depending on the nature of the saving in time-compression costs.
Introduction
Technology transfer from developed economies to less developed ones has been an important engine of growth of emerging market economies. A common mode of technology transfer is the setting up of a joint venture between a multinational and a local …rm 1 . Governments of emerging market economies often encourage such joint ventures. In fact, the Chinese government does not allow foreign car manufacturers to have their own subsidiaries in China.
It requires foreign car manufacturers to form joint ventures (JVs) with local …rms so that the latter can bene…t from technology transfer. In addition, foreign car manufacturers must obtain the Chinese government's permission to form JVs.
A salient feature of international joint ventures is that breakup typically happens within a few years. The local partner may have strong incentives to break away, once it has accumulated su¢ cient technological knowledge. A multinational …rm that o¤ers a joint venture contract to a local …rm must take into account the possibility of such opportunistic be- This paper considers the e¤ect of an anticipated breakup on the manipulation of actual breakup time via distorting the level of technology transfer. We assume the multinational …rm always honors its promises (because it wants to maintain its reputation in other countries), but it cannot prevent the local …rm from breaking away after receiving technology transfer.
The problem for the multinational …rm is to give an incentive to the local …rm to stay longer, because after the breakup, it will be obliged to stop production in the host country, while the local …rm will gain by using the acquired knowledge as a stand-alone …rm. Incentives for the local partner to stay longer can be either in the form of a large ‡ow of side payments or a promised increase in the transfer of knowledge before the break (which, if not well-designed, can become itself an incentive to leave sooner). In the …rst case, the local …rm will bene…t a lot before the breakup, while in the second case the local …rm will reap a large pro…t after the breakup. In this context, within a …xed horizon, a …rst key feature of our model is to know how the multinational will balance between an intensive and an extensive mode of knowledge transfer. Given a total amount of knowledge to be transferred, at one extreme one can choose a highly intensive transfer mode (a fast rate of transfer over a short period of time) and at the other extreme, one can opt for an extensive transfer mode (a slow transfer rate over a long period of time). Then, if the transfer of knowledge is too intensive, the local …rm will quit sooner to bene…t alone, for a longer time, of a large total amount of knowledge accumulated before the breakup. In this case the pro…t for the multinational will be of short duration. Furthermore, the breakup time being not contractible, the multinational …rm may have to rely on second-best technology transfer schemes that do not maximize joint surplus, but that are incentive compatible.
In our model three key features of technology transfer play a major role: it is costly, it takes time and it generates value. i) it is costly: the faster the pace of knowledge transfer, the more costly it is. Indeed, there are "time-compression costs" (Dierickx and Cool,1989 ) and absorptive capacity costs (Cohen and Levinthal,1990) . For a given total amount of knowledge to be transferred, the shorter the interval of time the multinational spends to transfer it, the greater will be its transfer cost.
ii) it takes time: time is an essential element here. The earlier the breakup, the more time would be available for the local …rm to reap the rewards of value creation, and the shorter is the phase of positive pro…t for the multinational. This is a speci…c form of the famous "exploration-exploitation" trade-o¤ (March,1991) where the opportunity cost of exploring (learning) is the reduced time for exploitation for the fully acquired knowledge 2 . In our model, exploration represents, for each unit of time until the breakup, a transfer of knowledge, while exploitation is the ability to reap some pro…t. The multinational will not be able to exploit after the breakup, while the local …rm can exploit both before and after the breakup.
The resolution of this trade-o¤, the right balance between exploration and exploitation, depends on what type of knowledge is involved: knowledge in the sense of information ("to know what"), or knowledge in the sense of ability to act ("to know how", learning by doing or by thinking). Knowledge can be more or less tacit. To be able to use it an agent can imitate the "teacher", or the teacher must codify the knowledge to be transferred, changing tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. There is also the need for a preparation phase (building absorptive capacities). The costs of transferring knowledge include costs of achieving mutual understanding, of improving assimilation capabilities, codi…cation costs, etc.
iii) it generates value: the more knowledge the multinational transfers before the breakup, the larger is the joint pro…t per unit of time before the breakup, and the larger is the standalone pro…t of the local …rm after the breakup.
In this dynamic context, our paper explores the e¤ect of a potential joint-venture breakup on the level of technology transfer in a set-up with exploration-exploitation trade-o¤s in the presence of time compression costs and imperfect property rights. Thus, supported by a side-payment scheme, the nature of transfer costs will determine the optimal intensive vs.
extensive mode of transfer, the total amount of knowledge transferred before the breakup and the optimal breakup time.
We will compare the …rst-best and second-best cases by asking the following questions:
(i) if …rst-best contracts are not implementable, is the speed of technology transfer reduced?
(ii) Is the cumulative amount of technology transfer lower under the second-best scheme?
(iii) Does the side payment increase over time to give an incentive to delay the breakup ?
(iv) How do exogenous changes in transfer cost impact the time pro…le of transfer ?
In response to breakup incentives, we show that the multinational …rm transfers technology in a less intensive but more extensive way compared to the …rst-best. The scheme is supported by a ‡ow of side payments to encourage the local …rm to stay longer. We show that a fall in time compression costs may increase or decrease the intensity of technology transfer, both in the …rst-best and in the second-best scenarios, depending on the nature of the time compression costs economies, the length of the time horizon and on the maximum absorptive capacity.
We formulate a dynamic model of principal-agent relationship in which at any point of time the agent (the local …rm) can quit without legal penalties. An interesting feature of the model is that the agent's reservation value is changing over time, because the agent's knowledge capital increases with the accumulated amount of technology transfer. The agent's quitting value (i.e., how much it can earn as a stand-alone …rm over the remaining time horizon) is a non-monotone function of time. Given a planned time path of technology transfer, during the early phase of the relationship, the local …rm's quitting value is rising with time. However, near the end of the time horizon, when the transferred knowledge would 4 become useless because a new product (developed elsewhere) renders the existing product completely obsolete, the local …rm's quitting value is falling over time. Because of this non-monotonicity of quitting value, the local …rm's optimal quitting time (in the absence of side transfer payments) occurs before the projected end of the …rst-best relationship. Such an early breakup may be prevented if the principal (the multinational) designs a suitable scheme in which both the pace and aggregate amount of technology transfer deviate from the …rst-best, and a suitable ‡ow of side payments to encourage the local …rm to stay longer.
Our model is linked to two streams of the literature. The …rst one focuses on the de…nition and properties of the costs of technology transfer, while the second stream, typically relying on two-period formulation, concerns the technology transfer within a joint venture.
Our assumptions on the costs of technology transfer are based on empirical …ndings.
An early paper that discussed the resource cost of transferring technology know-how was Teece (1977 scenarios. We also examine a fall in b which represents a global fall in the time-compression cost. Results on the impact of a fall in transfer cost on the equilibrium amount of technology transfer di¤er, depending on whether a such a fall is caused by a rise in or by a fall in b. Then, in modelling the endogenous pace and duration of technology transfer, our paper, by seriously taking into account "time-compression costs", provides a useful framework to investigate theoretical support for the hypothesis that the degree of intellectual property protection in ‡uences the extent of technology transfer (for a survey of empirical evidence, see Mans…eld, 1994). 4 The second major contribution of our model is an explicit account of the incentive problem of technological transfer in a dynamic setting. This topic has been considered by Ethier and Markusen (1996) , Markusen (2001) , and Roy Chowdhury and Roy Chowdhury (2001) using two-periods models. The questions we wish to address, namely the determination of the optimal and second-best pace of technology transfer, cannot be examined adequately in a two-period model. With just two periods, one cannot model the "spreading" e¤ect (transferring knowledge over a longer period of time) and the e¤ect of a reduction in transfer cost on the timing and amount of technology transfer. Our model, set in continuous time, is capable of generating a richer set of results. It enables us to show how to achieve the balance between the intensive and the extensive modes of transfer, and to determine jointly the optimal length of the transfer phase and the optimal total amount of knowledge to be transferred (both in the …rst-best case and the second-best cases). Furthermore, our result on non-monotonicity of the local …rm's value of quitting as a function of quitting time cannot be obtained in two-period models. This non-monotonicity has important bearing on the principal's optimal speed of technology transfer. There are two important considerations here. On the one hand, …rst-best e¢ ciency requires trading o¤ higher absorption cost associated with faster transfer against higher bene…t of knowledge accumulation. On the other hand, a high speed of transfer brings the local …rm's optimal quitting time closer to the present, which is detrimental to the multinational. Ethier and Markusen (1996) presented a model involving a race among source-country …rms to develop a new product that becomes outdated after two periods. 5 The winning …rm 4 By emphasizing the time-compression cost, our model di¤ers signi…cantly from the licensing models (e.g. Kabiraj and Marjit (2003) , Mukherjee and Pennings (2006) ) in which technology transfer is via licensing, which does not use up real resources. 5 With this assumption, the time horizon of a …rm is e¤ectively restricted to two periods.
has the exclusive right to produce the good in the source country (S), and can produce the They used a two-period setting, with a multinational …rm and a local …rm. They showed that for intermediate levels of demand, there is a joint venture formation between these …rms in period 1, followed by a joint venture breakdown in period 2 (when the two …rms become Cournot rivals). In their model, the incentive for forming a joint venture is that both …rms can learn from each other (the local …rm acquires the technology while the multinational learns about the local labor market). The model does not allow the multinational to control the speed of technology transfer.
In the papers mentioned above, by restricting to two-period models, the question of optimal timing of breakup cannot be studied in rich detail. Among papers that deal with optimal timing decisions of multinational …rms is Buckley and Casson (1981) . They analyzed the decision of a foreign …rm to switch from the "exporting mode"to the FDI mode (in setting up a wholly owned subsidiary). That paper did not deal with the problem of opportunistic behavior that would arise if there were a local partner. Horstmann and Markusen (1996) explored the multi-period agency contract between a multinational …rm and a local agent The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and characterizes the …rst-best pace of technology transfer when contracts are perfectly enforceable, so that a joint-venture breakup is not allowed. Section 3 shows that if breakup can happen without penalties, and the local …rm faces a credit constraint, then the …rst-best pace of technology transfer is not an equilibrium outcome, because the multinational would want to modify the pace of technology transfer in order to (partially) counter the incentives of breakaway. We …nd that the equilibrium outcome under credit constraint and imperfect property rights involves a slower pace of technology transfer, and also results in a lower cumulative technology transfer. 6 Section 4 shows that without credit constraint or with perfect property rights the …rst-best pace of technology transfer is the equilibrium outcome.
Section 5 shows how an exogenous fall in transfer costs (e.g. because of reduced barriers to communication) a¤ects the equilibrium transfer rate as well as the total amount of transfer.
The Appendices contain proofs.
The Basic Model

Assumptions and Notation
We consider a developing country in which a good can be produced using local inputs (such as labor and raw material) and technological knowledge which can be transferred from a foreign …rm. Unlike most existing models which assume that the technology transfer can happen immediately, we take the view that there are absorption costs and training costs which rise at an increasing rate with the speed of technology transfer, and which make an once-over technology transfer unpro…table. We therefore explicitly introduce time as a crucial element in our model. We take time to be a continuous variable, t 2 [0; T ]. Here T is an exogenously given terminal time of the game. It can be interpreted as the time beyond which the product ceases to be valuable (cf. the product cycle theory of Vernon).
Let h(t) denote the rate of technology transfer at time t: The state of technological knowledge of the local …rm at time t is denoted by H(t) where
(reduced-form) "gross pro…t" of the joint venture at time t is assumed to be a function of H(t) alone. It is denoted by (H(t)) where (:) is a continuous, concave and strictly increasing function, with = 0 if H = 0. This gross pro…t does not include "absorption cost"which is denoted by C(h(t)). We assume that C(h) is continuous, strictly convex and increasing in h, with C(0) = 0. This implies that for all h > 0, the marginal absorption cost is greater than the average absorption cost, C 0 > C=h. We also assume that there is an upper bound on h, denoted by h > 0.
Let us make the following speci…c assumptions:
Assumption A1: (a) The di¤erence between marginal absorption cost and average absorp-
Assumption A2: The time horizon T is su¢ ciently short, such that
Assumption A3: The elasticity of marginal contribution of technology to pro…t is less than or equal to unity:
Remark 1: Assumption A1(a) implies that
Clearly, the function C(h) = bh (where > 1 and b > 0) satis…es A1(a). Assumption A1 (b) means that the return (over the life-time of the joint venture) of a very small technology transfer is higher than its marginal cost. Assumption A2 ensures that the optimal constant h is strictly smaller than h. 7 Assumption A3 implies that t 0 (ht) is increasing in t. We use this assumption to prove the optimal solution is unique (see Proposition 1 below) and to
show that the equilibrium outcome under credit constraint and imperfect property rights results in a lower cumulative technology transfer (see section 3.4). Clearly, the function (H) = (K= )H where 0 < 1 and K > 0 satis…es A3.
We assume that the foreign …rm and the local …rm form a joint venture. We …rst consider the ideal case where contracts can be enforced costlessly. In this case the joint venture chooses a time path of technology transfer and production that maximizes the joint surplus.
In analyzing this ideal case, our focus is on e¢ ciency. The surplus sharing rule under this …rst-best scenario is not important for our purposes.
After characterising the …rst-best (e¢ cient) time path of technology transfer, we discuss whether this path can be achieved if the local …rm can at any time break away from the joint venture and become a stand-alone entity that captures all the post-breakaway pro…t (we assume that after the breakaway, the joint venture vanishes, and the multinational …rm leaves the host country). The answer will depend on what kind of contracts are feasible, in particular, on whether the local …rm has access to a perfect credit market, and whether the multinational is entitled to compensation by the local …rm after the breakaway (i.e.
whether property rights are perfectly enforceable). In the absence of a perfect credit market and a perfect property rights regime, we show that the foreign …rm must design a secondbest contract. We show that the second-best contract involves a slower pace of technology transfer, and a lower level of cumulative technology transfer. We argue that this outcome could be detrimental to the host country.
The …rst-best solution
For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate is zero. The joint-surplus maximization problem is to choose a time path h(t) over the time horizon T to maximize
Let us simplify the problem by restricting the set of admissible time paths of technology transfer, so that it consists of the following two-parameter family of piece-wise constant 7 As shown in the Appendix, assumption A2 can be replaced by a weaker assumption.
functions (the case where h(t) is not constrained to be piece-wise constant is analysed in a companion paper):
where t S is the "technology-transfer-stopping time", beyond which there will be no further technology transfer, and h is a constant transfer rate, to be chosen. After the time t S , the level of technological knowledge of the joint venture is a constant, denoted by H S where H S ht S .The optimization problem of the joint venture then reduces to that of choosing two numbers h and t S to maximize
subject to 0 h h and 0 t S T .
Proposition 1:
The solution of the (…rst-best) optimization problem (6) of the joint venture exists, is unique, and has the following properties:
(i) The rate of technology transfer h during the time interval [0; t S ] is strictly positive and strictly below the upper bound h.
(ii) The stopping time t S is strictly positive and is smaller than the time horizon T:
(iii) The marginal bene…t (over the remaining time horizon) of the technological knowledge stock at the stopping time t S is just equal to the average absorption cost:
(iv) At the optimal technology transfer rate h , the excess of the marginal absorption cost over the average absorption cost is just equal to average of the marginal contribution of technology to pro…t over the transfer phase:
Proof : See Appendix 1.
Remark 2:
Since C(h) > 0 for any h > 0 and H(0) = 0, the assumption that (H) = 0 when H = 0 implies that, for any h > 0, there exists an initial time interval called the "loss-making phase"over which the joint venture's net cash ‡ow, (ht) C(h), is negative.
This phase ends at time t + (h) which is de…ned, for any given h > 0, as follows:
Example 1:
where > 1 and c > 0. Then using equations (7) and (8) we get:
and
Thus the cumulative transfer is
In the rest of the paper, we will illustrate our results with the three following numerical examples: 2.3 Implementation of the …rst best when the local …rm cannot break away
Denote by V (h ; t S ) the net pro…t of the joint venture under the …rst-best solution. Let us assume that the local …rm would form a joint venture with the foreign …rm only if the payo¤ to the owner of the local …rm is at least equal to its reservation level R L . We consider only the case where R L < V (h ; t S ). Assume there are many potential local …rms. Then the foreign …rm will o¤er the local …rm the payo¤ R L , and keep to itself the di¤erence V (h ; t S ) R L .
Suppose it is possible to enforce a contract that speci…es that the joint venture will not be dissolved before the end of the …xed time horizon T . Then the foreign …rm will be able to implement the …rst best technology transfer scheme that we found above. In the following sections, we turn to the more interesting case where the local …rm is not bound to any long-term contract.
Joint venture contracts when the local …rm can break away
We now turn to the real world situation where the local …rm can break away at any time, taking with it the technological knowledge that has been transferred, without having to compensate the multinational. For simplicity, we assume that after the breakaway, the multinational is unable to produce in the host country. The local …rm can break away at any time 0 t B T and become a stand-alone …rm in the local market, bene…ting from the cumulative amount of technology transfer up to that date, H (t B ). In this section, we assume the following market failures:
Credit market failure (C1): The local …rm cannot borrow any money, hence the multinational has to bear all the losses of the joint venture during the loss-making phase [0; t
where t + (h) is as de…ned by equation (9) (the multinational …rm is not subject to any credit constraint). The multinational …rm cannot ask the local …rm to post a bond which the latter would have to forfeit if it breaks away (the local …rm cannot raise money for such a bond).
Property rights failure (C2):
The multinational cannot get any compensation payments from the local …rm after the breakaway time t B .
Without the credit market failure, the multinational …rm would be able to ask the local …rm to pay as soon as it receives any technology transfer. Without the property rights failure, the prospect of having to compensate the multinational would deter the local …rm from breaking away. Let us make clear the meaning of (C1) and (C2) above by describing the payo¤ function of the multinational and that of the local …rm.
We assume that the multinational …rm can credibly commit to honor any contract it o¤ers. This assumption seems reasonable, because multinational …rms operate in many countries and over a long time horizon, so it has an interest in keeping a good reputation.
Then we can without loss of generality suppose that the multinational o¤ers a contract which speci…es that it collects all the pro…ts of the joint venture, and pays the local …rm a ‡ow of side payments w(t) for all t until the local …rm breakaway.
After the breakaway, if C2 does not hold, the multinational can successfully ask for a ‡ow of compensation payment (t) from the local …rm, to be paid from t B to T . In the rest of this paper we analyse di¤erent situations where the ‡ows w(:) and (:) are constrained.
The total payo¤s of the multinational …rm and of the local …rm are, respectively,
13 and
The payo¤ implications of the market failures (C1) and (C2) are described below.
C1: The local …rm cannot borrow: In this case, at all time t, the local …rm's cumulative net cash ‡ow up to time t, denoted by N L (t); must be non-negative. Thus
C2: The multinational cannot obtain from the local …rm any compensation payment after the breakaway time:
The goals of this section are (a) to show that when both constraints (15) and (16) hold the …rst-best technology transfer scheme is in general not achievable, and (b) to characterize the second-best technology transfer scheme. In a later section, we will point out that if one of these two assumptions is completely removed, the …rst-best can be recovered.
Technology transfer with two market imperfections
We now consider the case where the local …rm can break away, there is no credit market, and the multinational cannot get any side payment after the breakaway.
Using the constraint that (t) = 0 and the fact that (H (t)) 0, the borrowing constraint C1, condition (15) , can be simpli…ed to
For simplicity, from this point we assume that the reservation value R L is 0. Then the participation constraint V L R L is satis…ed when the borrowing constraint (17) holds.
Then, the program of the multinational can be written as max h;t S ;w(:)
subject to 0 t S T; 0 h h, the incentive constraint
and the credit constraint (17) .
Here
3.2 The local …rm' s secure payo¤
Let us consider what would happen if during the pro…t-making phase, the multinational …rm takes 100% of the pro…t and does not make any side transfer to the local …rm. Under this scenario, clearly the local …rm has an incentive to break away at or before the time t S (after t S , it has nothing to lose by breaking away). The local …rm wants to choose a breakaway
Given that w(:) = 0 identically, the payo¤ to the local …rm if it breaks
where
Here the superscript 0 in V 0 L indicates that the local …rm's share of pro…t before the breakaway time is identically zero. Given (h; t S ), the local …rm knows that if it breaks away at time t S , it will get (T t S ) (ht S ). If it breaks away at some earlier time t B < t S , it will get (T t B ) (ht B ). The local …rm must choose t B in [0; t S ], to maximize
Lemma 1: Given that w(:) = 0 identically (i.e. there is no side transfer from the multinational to the local …rm),
the local …rm will break away at the planned transfer-stopping time t S , and earns the payo¤
(ii) If
the local …rm will break away at a unique b t B (h); strictly earlier than the planned transferstopping time t S ; and earn the (secure) payo¤
(iii) In both cases, a small increase in h will increase the local …rm's payo¤ by T b t B (h)
where, in the …rst case, b t B (h) = t S , and in the second case, b t B (h) satis…ed the interior …rst order condition:
The function R(h; t B ) is strictly concave over (0; t S ) ; because
Consider the derivative of R(h; t B ) with respect to t B ;
Thus if (T t S ) 0 (ht S )h (ht S ) 0 then, due to the strict concavity of R(h; t B ) in t B ;
we know (T t B ) 0 (ht B )h (ht B ) > 0 for all t B < t S , and it follows that the local …rm
attains its maximum at some t B < t S . To prove (iii), note that in the case of b t B = t S (corner solution), if after a small increase in h, the corner solution
But the term inside the curly brackets f:::g is zero. This concludes the proof.
Remark 3: Strictly speaking, the (secure) pro…t should be written as
However, this formalism is quite unnecessary.
Example 2: Use the speci…cation of example 1. Independently of the value of h, if t S > +1 T ;condition (25) is satis…ed, and the local …rm will break away at b t B = +1 T < t S . If
T , condition (24) is satis…ed, and the local …rm will break away at b t B = t S (see Appendix 2).
Using the parameters of example 1a, the interior-breakaway condition (25) becomes t S > 15. In Figure 1 , the curve V (h ; t S ); where h = 40; shows that the multinational payo¤ under the …rst-best scenario is single-peaked in t S , and its optimal t S is t S = 20: Now, given h = 40 and t S = 20, under the imperfect property rights regime, the local …rm can break away at time t B and earns a payo¤ R(h ; t B ). We …nd that R(h ; t B ) is non-monotone in t B : if the local …rm (…rm L) breaks away too early, it has too little knowledge capital to take away. If it breaks away too late, it has a lot of knowledge capital to take away, but too little remaining time before the end of the time horizon. The local …rm will break away at b t B (h ) = 15. This shows that the …rst-best scheme in example 1a, (h ; t S ) = (40; 20) ; is not implementable (in the absence of any side payment). Using the parameters of example 1c condition (24) becomes t S 15. This shows that the …rst-best scheme in example 1c, (h ; t S ) = (39; 10) is implementable (but the multinational does not get the pro…t that it would get if the joint venture were a wholly owned subsidiary).
The local …rm will break away at time b t B (h ) = t S = 10. , c = 1; K = 0:1; h = h ' 39) Figure 2 illustrates the case where the local …rm would prefer that the transfer stops later than the …rst-best stopping-time, so that when it breaks away it will get a higher stock of knowledge. The local …rm's preferred transfer stopping-time is t = 15. But, since the multinational chooses to stop the technology transfer at t S = 10, the local …rm has an incentive to break away at the same time.
Incentive compatible contract under credit constraint
Given that the local …rm must have non-negative cash ‡ow at all time, and that, in the absence of transfer payment from the multinational, it can secure the pro…t V L (h) = (T b t B (h)) (h b t B (h)) by breaking away at an optimal day, the multinational …rm must design a contract (with transfer payments) that maximizes its payo¤, subject to the constraint that the local …rm earns at least V L (h).
In the absence of side payments, if the local …rm stays with the joint venture until a
. (Here, the superscript c in t C B indicates that it is induced by a contractual ‡ow of side payments, as will be seen below.)Therefore, if the multinational wishes to induce the local …rm to break away no sooner than t responding to such incentives, will choose to break away at time t C B and (b) the total side payment is minimal with respect to the incentive constraint and the borrowing constraint.
All these solutions satisfy
These ‡ows have the same present value. The only di¤erence between the various incentivecompatible ‡ows w C (:) is how the ‡ow is spread out between b t B (h) and t Recall that F = V L (h) R(h; t B ), and that R(h; t B ) is decreasing in t B for all t B > b t B (h). So, for any sequence of dates 18 ft 1 < t 2 < t 3 < ::: < t n g where b t B (h) < t 1 < t n = t C B , it holds that The above argument supposes that payments are made in small amounts at a large number of discrete points of time. We can take the limit as the size of these time intervals go to zero, and n goes to in…nity. This yields a continuous ‡ow w
. Remark that this ‡ow is increasing in t because R(h; t) is concave in t,
All the above side transfer payments schemes have the same e¤ect on the local …rm's quitting time. We can therefore focus, without loss of generality, on the following particular ‡ow of side payments (which concentrates at a point of time, i.e. the ‡ow becomes a mass). The multinational o¤ers to pay the local …rm a lump sum amount F 0 if the latter breaks away at a speci…ed time t C B . Since the multinational does not want to overpay the local …rm, the lump sum F will be just enough to make the local …rm indi¤erent between (a) breaking away at b t B (h) thus earning the secured pay-o¤ V L (h), and (b) breaking away at the contractual breakaway time t C B , thus earning F + T t
Therefore the side payment written in the contract is
Let us now make use of the incentive constraint (35) to determine the multinational's optimal choice of both h and t C B to maximize its own payo¤:
The …rst order condition with respect to t
This condition has the same form as the …rst best condition (see equation (7)), except of course the value h is in general not the same. The …rst order condition with respect to h is
Example 3: Using the parameters of example 1b, b t B (h) = 10; then V L (h) = 40 p 10h. , c = 1; K = 2; t = t S = 18) Figure 3 illustrates that, given the …rst best transfer-stopping time t S = 18, if the local …rm can secure V L (h) (which is increasing in h), the multinational has an incentive to reduce the pace of technology transfer to h ' 3:93 lower than h ' 5:04.
Comparison with the …rst best
In this sub-section, we show that the second-best scheme described above implies that i) the multinational will choose a slower transfer rate h C < h and ii) the cumulative technology transfer is also lower. We prove this for the general case (where the pro…t function (H) is concave), and provide an explicit solution for the case of a linear pro…t function (H) = KH,
First, let us show that the two equations (37) and (39) yield (h C ; t C B ) with h C < h and t C B > t S , where (h ; t S ) is the solution of the system of …rst order conditions in the …rst best case studied in Section 2. For easy reference, we reproduce that system below:
To show that h C < h and t C B > t S , we use the following method. Let be an indicator, which can take any value between zero and 1. Consider the following system of equations:
Clearly, if = 1, the system (42)- (43) is equivalent to the system of equations (37)- (39) and
, and if = 0, the system (42)- (43) is equivalent to the system of equations (41)- (40) and thus yield (h; t) = (h ; t S ). For an arbitrary 2 [0; 1], the solution of the system is denoted by e h( ); e t( ) . 
We now show that e h( ) is decreasing in and e t( ) is increasing in . Let
, and by the second order condition W 22 <
This proves that e h( ) is decreasing in .
We now show that W 21 < 0, where W 21 = C 0 + (T t)(ht 00 + 0 ).Using (43),
where the strict inequality follows from the assumption on C(h): average cost is smaller than marginal cost. It follows that W 21 < 0. This proves that e t( ) is increasing in .
Let us compare the total quantity of technology transfer in the …rst best case H h t S and the quantity in the second best case
Using (45) 
Using assumption A3 (
Using (42) we obtain
Then, if > 0, e t 0 ( e H) > C 0 ( e h) (T e t) 0 e H : Using this inequality and (51), we get e tW 22 e hW 21 < 0:This proves that H C < H .
The following proposition summarizes the …nding of this section:
Proposition 2: To counter the local …rm's opportunistic behavior, the multinational …rm designs a second best scheme that involves a slower rate of technology transfer (thus reducing the local …rm's secure payo¤ ) and a lower total cumulative technology transfer. It also o¤ers side payments to the local …rm to delay the breakaway time. The side payments can be in the form of a continuous ‡ow that increases with time, or a lump sum payable at a contracted breakaway time. 4 Implementation of …rst-best technology transfer with one market imperfection
In this section, we brie ‡y indicate that if we relax one of the two assumptions C1 or C2, there exists a contract which implements the …rst best technology transfer.
Case A: Perfect credit market and no compensation payment after the breakaway Assume that the local …rm is not liable to make compensation payments after the breakaway time, i.e. C2 holds: (t) = 0 for all t between t B and T . The multinational asks the local …rm to pay it up-front the value of the joint venture, V (h ; t S ), and gives the local …rm the right to collect at each point of time t in (0; t S ) the net cash ‡ow (h t) C(h ). Hence the local …rm's breakaway at time t S as it has to solve the …rst best program.
Case B: Imperfect credit market and compensation payment must be made after the breakaway
In this case, the multinational pays the losses from 0 to t + (h),
and gives the local …rm the right to collect the positive cash ‡ow (h t) C(h ) for all t between t + (h) and t S . In return, the local …rm must, during the phase [t + (h); T ] , pay gradually to the multinational the total amount V (h ; t S )
a way that the local …rm's net cash ‡ow is non-negative at each point of time.
The E¤ect of a Fall in Transfer Costs on the Intensity of Technology Transfer
In this section, we obtain some comparative static results on parametric changes on the may impact the intensity of technology transfer, both under the …rst-best scenario (perfect property rights) and under the second-best scenario. For simplicity, we will assume the pro…t function is linear, (H) = KH, and consider two di¤erent interpretations of a "fall in transfer cost". We call these Type I and Type II fall in transfer cost, respectively. In both cases, the upper-bound on feasible transfer rate is denoted by h.
Type I fall in transfer costs
Consider the convex transfer cost function C(h) = b(h=h) where > 1 and b > 0. Then C(0) = 0 and C(h) = 1. An increase in is called a Type I fall in transfer costs. It has two e¤ects. First, C(h) becomes lower for any h 2 0; h . We call this the "cost-saving e¤ect".
Second, when increases, the marginal cost of transfer becomes lower for small h (near h = 0) but it becomes higher for h near the upper-bound h. 9 We call this the "convexity-
modifying e¤ect". Intuitively, the …rst e¤ect favors an increase in h, i.e., a speeding-up of technology transfer, and the second e¤ect favors an increase in h if h is small, and a decrease in h if h is large. What is the net e¤ect on h? We can show that the answer depends crucially on the size of two exogenous variables, namely the maximum feasible transfer rate h, and the length of the time horizon, T . We obtain the following results (the proofs of which are in Appendix 5).
Result A1 (on transfer rate)
In the …rst-best scenario, a Type I fall in transfer cost (an increase in ) will result in a lengthening of the transfer phase, [0; t S ] : It will also result in an increase of transfer rate (i.e., an increase in h) in the case where h or T are small enough so that hT b=K).
However, in the case where hT > b=K, an increase in will result in an increase in h only if the existing is greater than a threshold level e ; if < e , a small increase in will result in a decrease in h.
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The intuition behind Result 1 is as follows. If hT is small, then the optimal h is small, therefore the "convexity-modifying e¤ect" works in the same direction as the "cost saving"
e¤ect. If hT is large, then the optimal h is large, therefore "convexity-modifying e¤ect"and "cost saving" e¤ect work in opposite directions. The cost saving e¤ect is stronger only if is large enough.
Result A2 (on …rst-best accumulated transfer)
The e¤ect of a Type I fall in transfer cost on total transfer, h t S , depends on the size of the maximum feasible accumulated transfer hT . If hT b=K, then h t S will increase with . If hT > b=K, an increase in will lead to an increase in h t S only if the existing is greater than a threshold level b < e ; if < b , a small increase in will lead to a decrease in h t S .
For > e , an increase in increases both h and t S (from Result A1 above) so clearly h t S increases. Given hT > b=K, if 2 (b ; e ) the t S -lengthening e¤ect of a small increase in outweighs the h -decreasing e¤ect of a small increase in , therefore h t S increases, while if < b the latter e¤ects dominates, so h t S decreases.
Result A3 (on the second-best case)
11
(i) In the second-best scenario, a Type I fall in transfer cost (i.e., an increase in ) will increase the "contractual" breakup time t is positive for h near h and negative for h near zero. 10 The threshold level is dependent (in fact increasing) in hT . Note also that we assume an interior solution, h < h, for which it is necessary and su¢ cient that 2 1 > hT K=b. 11 We restrict attention to interior second-best solutions, h C < h. A su¢ cient condition for this is hT K=b < 2 1.
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(ii)The ratio t C B =t S is greater than unity; it decreases if increases.
(iii) The ratio h C =h is smaller than unity; it increases if increases.
(iv) If hT b=K, then, h C increases with .
(v) If hT > b=K, there exists e c > 1 such that h C increases with for e c .
(
b=K, there exists such that h C decreases with for 2 (1; ) and increases with for > .
Type II fall in transfer costs
In the example considered above, it was assumed that C(h) = b(h=h) where > 1 and b > 0. Clearly a decrease in b also represents a fall (but of a di¤erent type) in transfer costs.
When b decreases, this reduces transfer cost at any given h, and unambiguously reduces the marginal cost of transfer, regardless of whether h is near zero or near h.
When b decreases, there are two e¤ects on the cost function. First, for h given, the cost of transfer decreases. This e¤ect tends to favor an increase in h. Second, the cost curve becomes less convex, as marginal cost falls. This is the "convexity or curvature" e¤ect. This convexity e¤ect favors an increase in h. In contrast to the previous example where there were two e¤ects that could go in opposite directions, here the two e¤ects are going in the same direction. This explains why our results (presented below) for a Type II fall in transfer costs are not ambiguous. We obtain the following result (see Appendix 5).
Result B:
In both the …rst-best and second-best scenarios, a Type II fall in transfer costs (a decrease in b) will not a¤ect the duration of the transfer ( t S and t C B ). It results in an increase of transfer rate (i.e., an increase in h and h C ) and an increase of the amount of technology transferred ( h t S and h C t C B ).
Concluding Remarks
Our model seems to be the …rst theoretical formulation of the problem of choice of the pace of technology transfer from a multinational …rm to a joint venture in a host country, with special emphasis on the time-compression costs of technology transfer. We have shown that when the host country cannot enforce joint venture contract, the multinational will have an incentive to reduce both the pace of technology transfer and the cumulative amount of technology transfer even if the duration of the transfer is longer. In other words, transfer is both reduced and delayed. The sign of the comparative statics of a "fall in technologytransfer costs" on the pace of transfer (both in the …rst-best and second-best scenarios) is shown to depend on the life-span of the product, T , and the maximum feasible speed of transfer, h.
A major implication of our model is that if the host country's legal system is not su¢ -ciently strong to prevent breakaway by local …rms, the multinational will reduce and delay the technology transfer. To the extent that technology transfers in one industry have positive spillover e¤ects to other industries in the host country, this country loses out by its inability to enforce contracts.
While the motive of our study is to shed light on technology transfer in a joint-venture, clearly our model can be applied to other situations involving the stability of relationships, such as employer-employee contracts, where the employee can learn from working in the …rm and leave the …rm once he has accumulated su¢ cient human capital.
Appendices Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
The choice set de…ned by = (h; t S ) : 0 h h and 0 t S T is a compact set.
The objective function (6) is continuous in the variables h; t S over the compact set . By
Weierstrass theorem, there exists a maximum, which we denote by (h ; t S ).
Next, we show that the maximum must be in the interior of the admissible set . Since (0) = C(0) = 0 and T 0 (0) > C 0 (0) 0, the function V (h; t S ) is strictly positive for some positive h su¢ ciently close to zero, for all t S . Since V (0; t S ) = 0 and V (h; 0) = 0, it follows that the optimum must occurs at some t S > 0 and h > 0. To prove (i) and (ii) above, it remains to show that an optimum cannot occur at any point on the line t S = T nor on the line h = h. To take into account the constraints T t S 0 and h h 0, we introduce the associated Lagrange multipliers 0 and 0. The Lagrangian is
The …rst order conditions are
(T t S ) = 0; 0; T t S 0;
(The intuition behind this result is simple: there is no point to transfer technology near the end of the time horizon T ). Thus = 0 and hence (A.2) reduces to
To show that h < h, let us suppose that h = h. Then, using (A.4), and h = h, condition (A.3) gives
which violates assumption A2. 12 Thus h < h. This concludes the proof that (h ; t S ) is in the interior of .
It follows that
It remains to verify the second order conditions. Recall that the FOCs at an interior maximum is
The SOCs are
Clearly V 11 < 0 and V 22 < 0. It remains to check that > 0 at (t S ; h ). Note that .12) 12 Note that we can replace assumption A2 by the following. Assumption A2':
(making use of (A.4)).
Consider the curve t S = (h) de…ned by (A.7) in the space (h; t S ) where h is measured along the horizontal axis. The slope of this curve is
Along this curve
as h ! 0, t S ! T , and as t S ! 0, h ! e h where e h is de…ned by
Next consider the curve t S = (h) de…ned by (A.8). The slope of this curve is
As h ! 0, t S ! 2T , and as
Thus the curve (h) must intersect the curve (h) from above (at least once). At that intersection, the slope of the (h) curve must be more negative (i.e. steeper) than the slope of the (h) curve, that is
Thus the SOC is satis…ed at that intersection.
Finally, we can show that under assumption A3, the two curves (h) and (h) intersect exactly once, that is, we show that > 0 whenever the FOCS are satis…ed. It is easy to see that A3 implies that t 0 (ht) is an increasing function of t.
We note the following facts. First,
Secondly,
Using the implication of assumption A1 stated in (3), which can be written as hC
, we have
. With (A.6), we know that
We conclude that > 0.
Appendix 2: The local …rm' s optimal breakaway time
Consider the isoelastic pro…t function (H) = (1= )H where 0 < < 1. Then equation (27) gives a unique b t B (h) that is independent of h :
Appendix 3: The incentive compatible contract when (H) is linear
The …rst order condition ((37) and (39))of the program can be rewritten as
Equivalently,
The solution is:
The contractual breakaway time is
This implies that
where > 0 and
The transfer rate is
The optimal lump sum F is
To prove that F > 0; it su¢ ces to show that
Since is linear, this condition reduces to
This condition is satis…ed, because, from (A.42)
where the strict inequality follows from
i.e. (a) the local …rm receives no payment prior to its "default breakaway time" b t B (h):
( 1)
(b) the sum of the accumulated side payments and the local …rm's stand-alone pro…t after
(c) and, for any time t where b t B (h) t t C B , the total payo¤ to the local …rm is inferior to its secured pro…t V L (h):
Proof:
(i) Proof of su¢ ciency: It is easy to verify that when w C (:) satis…es conditions (A.56), (A.57) and (A.58) it is a solution of (A.53).
(ii) Proof of necessity: Consider a solution of (A.53). We show that it must satisfy conditions (A.56), (A.57) and (A.58).
To show the necessity of condition (A.57), suppose that w C (:) does not satisfy condition 
Proof of Results A3:
The FOCs for the second best situation are Remark that in this case, the only di¤erence with the …rst best case is the constant term (KT ) 2 
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, hence the second order conditions are also satis…ed.
We can compute the second best duration and pace of technology transfer:
De…ne, for 1,
The second-best rate of transfer is
h which is less than h, given that hT The …rst term is positive and the second term is also positive. So ' 0 ( ) > 0.
Because the ratio
is increasing in , it follows that when h ( ) is increasing in , h C ( ) must be increasing in at a faster rate. Now, for hT > 1, then for e , where e is the threshold beyond which h ( ) increases with , h C ( ) must be increasing in . But clearly, by continuity, h C ( ) must also be increasing in for all belonging to some range ( ; e ) where1 < < e , and , there exists e e > 1 (where e e < e ) such that b h ( ) decreases with for 1 e e ; and b h ( ) increases with for e e : Now de…ne
Then 0 ( ) < 0 for all > 1. So when b h ( ) is decreasing, h C ( ) must be decreasing at a faster rate. And when b h ( ) is increasing, h C ( ) may be decreasing (at a slower rate) or increasing. It follows that there exists a threshold 2 e e ; e such that h C ( ) is decreasing if and only if < .
